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The Canadian Experience with
Counterfeiting
John F. Chant*
• Because of the important role that paper money
plays in Canada’s payments system, counter-
feiting is a signiﬁcant public policy issue. Both
the public and the central bank have a stake in
preventing counterfeiting.
• Changing technology in the form of photocopiers
and computer printers has led to a marked
increase in the threat of counterfeiting in all
economies since the early 1990s.
• An appropriate policy response to this crime is
necessary to maintain the public’s continued
conﬁdence in the national currency.
• Estimating the stock of counterfeits circulating is
necessary to assess the threat from counterfeiting,
including the possible loss of conﬁdence in a
currency. A composite method is proposed as an
effective alternative to existing methods.
• Indications are that there was one counterfeit note
in circulation for every 290 Canadians in 2001
and that the value of outstanding counterfeits was
less than 19 cents per person.
• The incidence of counterfeiting has nearly doubled
since 2001. The Bank of Canada is continuing to
introduce a new series of bank notes with more
advanced security features to discourage
counterfeiting.
* John Chant was Special Adviser at the Bank from September 2001 to August
2002. The views expressed in this article are those of the author. No responsi-
bility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. Issues related to
counterfeiting are discussed more fully in Chant (2004).
ounterfeiting has recently been in the spot-
light of public and media attention, even
though it is not the most lurid of crimes. Still,
there is much uncertainty about the level of
counterfeiting, leading to rumour and speculation
among the public. The Economist (2001) cites one foren-
sic analyst who claims that as much as 2 to 3 per cent
of the former eurocurrencies and 30 per cent of U.S.
dollars circulating in Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa,
and elsewhere may be counterfeit. These levels for
U.S. dollars contrast markedly with reports by the
U.S. Secret Service that only $47 million counterfeit
notes were detected in the United States during 2001.1
The recent attention raises a number of issues. Does
the heightened interest reﬂect changes in the signiﬁ-
cance of counterfeiting? What cost does counterfeiting
impose on Canadians? How signiﬁcant are counter-
feits relative to overall currency? What policy chal-
lengesdoescounterfeitingpose?Thisarticleaddresses
these issues with speciﬁc reference to the counterfeit-
ing experience in Canada for 2001.2
Counterfeiting is a signiﬁcant public policy issue
because, despite rumours of its demise, paper money
still remains an important part of our payments sys-
tem. Approximately $36 billion in currency was in the
hands of the public during 2001. Over 50 per cent of
the notes consisted of $20 bills, with the remainder
spread fairly evenly among the other denominations.
Canadian individuals and businesses (including
ﬁnancial institutions) held, on average over 2001,
almost 1.1 billion notes, or approximately 35 notes per
person, an amount equal to more than $1,200 per capita,
with 40 per cent of the value consisting of $100 notes.
1. See also Judson and Porter (2003), who deal directly with the circulation of
counterfeits outside the United States.
2. Estimates of circulating counterfeits for the years 1993 to 2003 are provided
in the Addendum to this article.
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Counterfeiting is a signiﬁcant public
policy issue because, despite rumours
of its demise, paper money still
remains an important part of our
payments system.
A number of parties have stakes in the prevention of
counterfeiting. The public, especially those handling
many currency payments, want to know the chances
they face of receiving a bogus bill in any transaction.
Central banks, which issue currency, want to know the
degree to which their currency has been corrupted by
counterfeits. Counterfeits represent a loss to these
issuers, and a sufﬁcient level of counterfeit circulation
may challenge the public acceptability of a currency.
While both the public and the press are showing
increased interest in counterfeiting, economists have
rarely studied it. This article seeks to redress the
imbalance by addressing the economic issues raised
by counterfeiting. It begins with a description of the
changes in technology that have heightened the
potential threat from counterfeiting, followed by an
examination of its economic costs to Canadians and a
discussion of the usefulness of different measures of
counterfeiting. It then proposes a technique for deter-
mining the extent of counterfeiting using available
data and presents estimates of the extent of counter-
feiting of Canadian currency.
New Challenges from Technology
The history of counterfeiting is as old as the history of
money itself. The ﬁrst commodity monies tempted
counterfeiters to ﬁnd cheaper materials to substitute
for those used in the money.3 Later, the development
of paper money made counterfeiting more attractive
by lowering the costs of producing money to a frac-
tion of its value in exchange. Not all changes in the
evolution of money have encouraged counterfeiting.
Some, such as the move away from many private cur-
rencies to national currencies, deterred counterfeiting
because the larger scale of production of legitimate
currency justiﬁed greater investment in security. The
move towards a national currency also meant the public
3.  Commodities that can be used as a medium of exchange and a store of
value are referred to as commodity monies. Historical examples include gold,
silver, diamonds, cattle, and furs.
would need to be familiar with the features of only
one currency to protect themselves from counterfeits.4
For most of the twentieth century, counterfeiting was
limited by the expensive investment in engraved
plates and offset presses needed to produce credible
forgeries. The introduction of sophisticated scanners,
colour photocopiers, and ink-jet printers in the early
1990s dramatically changed counterfeiting technology
by sharply lowering the costs. This change has been
reﬂected in a marked increase in the detection of coun-
terfeits in Canada since the early 1990s. By 2000, pho-
tocopies and ink-jet printed notes accounted for 98 per
cent of all the counterfeits detected in Canada.




technology by sharply lowering
the costs.
The changing technology has also altered both the
organization of counterfeiting and its vulnerability to
detection. Offset printing required substantial equip-
ment that was difﬁcult to conceal. Moreover, counter-
feits were produced in substantial runs and stored
before being placed into circulation. Together, these
features exposed counterfeiting operations to raids by
law-enforcement authorities. The new techniques
allow counterfeits to be produced on demand, reduc-
ing the need for inventories and dispersing them in a
wider variety of locations, making them more difﬁcult
to ﬁnd.
These changes have also altered the way in which
counterfeits are detected. Since 1990, detection has
shifted from the discovery of hoards of uncirculated
counterfeits towards the exposure of counterfeits in
circulation, which in 2001 accounted for 96 per cent of
the number of counterfeits detected in Canada.
4.  The exploits of the Johnson family in Canada and the United States in the
1880s illustrate the limited investment in security for some private bank
notes. Speer (1904) recounts that the Johnson forgeries could be distinguished
from authentic notes because they were “too perfect” and lacked the engrav-
ing ﬂaws present in the authentic notes.43 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
The Costs of Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting has three types of costs: redistribution
costs, prevention costs, and conﬁdence costs. The
redistribution and prevention costs are similar to
those of any other type of crime. The conﬁdence costs
are the consequence of the special role that currency
plays in the economy.
Redistribution costs refer to the loss of purchasing power
suffered by the people who end up holding counter-
feits when they are discovered. This cost consists of
the goods and services that victims exchange for the
counterfeit notes. A further redistribution cost arises
because counterfeits displace authentic notes issued
by the central bank. The central bank loses its so-called
seigniorage—the ﬂowofinterestitwould receivefrom
the government securities that it acquires through
issuing new currency—to the counterfeiters. Economists
note that redistribution costs are not a cost to the econ-
omy overall, since the losses suffered by the public
and the government are matched by the gains of the
counterfeiters—hence the term redistribution costs.
Prevention costs arise from the efforts that individuals,
businesses, governments, and central banks take to
escape bearing the redistribution costs of counterfeit-
ing. Individuals and businesses incur costs through
their efforts to avoid accepting counterfeits. Some of
these costs consist of expenditures taken to identify
counterfeits, such as training staff or investing in
counterfeit detectors. Others arise from not using cur-
rency or specific issues of currency out of fear of accepting
a counterfeit. In some cases, a speciﬁc denomination
may be avoided by suffering the inconvenience of
using other denominations. In other cases, using cur-
rency may be avoided by employing other forms of
payment, such as cheques, debit cards, credit cards, or
foreign currency, which may be less convenient.
The prevention efforts of government and central
banks differ from those of individuals and businesses
in that they are directed at stopping counterfeiting
itself. For governments, these costs consist of the extra
policing and judicial expenses. For central banks, pre-
vention costs arise from incorporating increasingly
expensive security features into currency and with-
drawing from circulation and prematurely replacing
issues that have become vulnerable to counterfeiting.
Unlike redistribution costs, prevention costs represent
a loss to society as a whole: resources are directed from
other uses to the prevention of counterfeiting. If coun-
terfeiting is typical of other crimes, the preventive
costs will be a multiple of the direct costs. Brantingham
and Easton (1998) estimate that total costs to Canadians
from property crimes in 1996 were $11.5 billion when
prevention costs are taken into account, an amount
that is 2.5 times the direct cost of property crime.
The conﬁdence costs of counterfeiting arise because of
the special network characteristics of currency. Like a
telephone, currency is of little use to a person unless
others use it as well. The decision of some people to
switch away from using currency will impose costs on
users because they have fewer partners to transact
with. If enough people lose faith in a particular
denomination or in a currency as a whole, it will be
compromised as a means of making payments.5
Perception, as distinct from reality, can be important
in determining whether a currency can retain the pub-
lic’s conﬁdence. When some retailers refuse to accept
a particular note, this has a demonstration effect on
other retailers who, although not having any unfortu-
nate experience themselves, may decide not to accept
the note. Customers may also choose not to use that
note, not because they fear counterfeits, but because
they fear that the notes will not be accepted.
Experience with the $100 note suggests that people
may question their conﬁdence in a currency even with
relatively low levels of counterfeiting. During 2001,
46,649 counterfeit $100 notes were detected from an
outstanding stock of almost 160.2 million authentic
notes, or less than three counterfeits for each 10,000
authentic $100 bills in circulation. Nevertheless, this
level of counterfeiting caused as many as 11 per cent
of merchants in some areas to refuse to accept $100
bills (Bank of Canada 2001). To the extent that people
change their currency-holding patterns, the Bank
would have to bear the cost of replacing $100billswith
multiples of lower-denomination notes.
The extreme case of loss of conﬁdence in all issues of a
country’s currency will require its replacement. To
date, there is limited experience with respect to the
point at which conﬁdence in a currency becomes lost.
In part, this is because currencies printed on inexpensive
photocopiers and ink-jet printers pose a different kind
of threat than in the past. Nevertheless, the costs of
counterfeiting have a parallel, albeit imperfect, in the
costs of inﬂation. Here, historical experience suggests
that currency is so useful that people continue to use it
even at very high inflation rates. Unlike the costs
of inﬂation, the costs of counterfeiting are, however,
disproportionately concentrated among merchants,
5.   Nosal and Wallace (2001) develop a model that suggests that counterfeit-
ing may preclude the possibility of a monetary equilibrium. This result con-
ﬁrms that counterfeiting is a serious threat that warrants substantial
preventive actions, even though its occurrence in practice may be low.44 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
especially fast food outlets and convenience stores,
where currency is the predominant means of pay-
ment. This difference in the incidence of costs means
that shifts away from currency use could take place at
lower levels of overall cost than the shifts that take
place as a result of inﬂation.
One possibility, when conﬁdence is lost, is that a for-
eign currency would replace the domestic currency in
circulation. Even if this can be an orderly process at
the hand-to-hand currency level, costly adjustments
would be required in the restatement of the accounts
of ﬁnancial institutions and other ﬁnancial contracts
into the substitute currency. Alternatively, domestic
currency could be replaced by other methods of pay-
ment, such as cheques and debit cards. In this case, the
costs would be less, since the currency could still be
used as the unit of account even though it did not pass
in circulation.
It is difﬁcult to estimate the costs to society as a whole
from losing the use of a national currency for making
payments. Such a loss would initially affect everyone
in the economy because of the time and effort neces-
sary to switch to a new payments method. Over a
longer period, everyone also faces the expense of
using a means of payment that is less efﬁcient than
currency. For these sources of loss, even a small cost
per person has substantial consequences, given that
virtually everyone uses currency. In addition to these
costs, the government will lose because the beneﬁt
from its central bank’s seigniorage will be transferred
to the issuers of the replacement for domestic cur-
rency. Future progress in the adoption and develop-
ment of alternative technologies for making payments,
such as debit cards or e-money, could alleviate the
consequences of reduced conﬁdence in a currency,
should it occur.
Estimating the Stock of Counterfeits
The extent of counterfeiting in an economy can be
measured by the current ﬂow of recoveries or by the
outstanding stock of counterfeit bills. These measures
differ in their signiﬁcance as well as their availability.
The ﬂow of recoveries can be measured directly and
measuresthecostsincurredbyindividualsandbusinesses
from accepting bogus currency.6 The stock of out-
standing counterfeits, on the other hand, shows the
6. Measuring total recoveries requires co-operation between policing authori-
ties, who are responsible for determining the number of counterfeits recov-
ered, and central banks, which detect counterfeits while processing bank
notes. The Bank of Canada is unusual among central banks in publishing sta-
tistics with respect to recoveries. See Bank of Canada (various years).
degree to which any currency, or denomination of cur-
rency, has been corrupted by counterfeits. By doing so,
it provides a basis for determining the seigniorage
losses to monetary authorities from the displacement of
the currency they issue.7 Equally important, it indicates
the potential threat to the continued use of paper money.8
Unlike the ﬂow of recoveries, the stock of counterfeits
cannot be measured directly. While it might appear
that the stock of counterfeits in circulation would be
closely related to the ﬂow of recoveries, this impres-
sion is incorrect. Table 1 shows that the same stock of
counterfeits can be consistent with widely different
levels of detection, depending on the length of time
counterfeit notes remain in circulation. The 129,000
counterfeits recovered during 2001, for example,
could be consistent with an outstanding stock as small
as 350 if counterfeits circulate for one day, or as large
as 645,000 if they circulate for ﬁve years.
Method of Estimation
In a rare attempt to measure the stock of circulating
counterfeits, the U.S. Treasury (2000) used two
approaches: the parts-found-in-processing (PFP) method
and the life-of-counterfeits (LOC) method. Each approach
has shortcomings. This article focuses on an alterna-
tive composite approach (COMP) that overcomes the
7.  Taxpayers are the ultimate losers in this case because the proﬁts of the
Bank of Canada are regularly transferred to the government.
8. Such a threat could materialize suddenly through the discovery of a simple
test that distinguishes real from counterfeit currency. Tom Ferguson, Director
of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, related how a simple detector
that left yellow marks on real bills because of their protein content was able to
distinguish real U.S. currency from counterfeits. Not surprisingly, counterfeit-
ers quickly countered by placing yellow marks on their bills to suggest that
they had already passed the test. Still, this device altered the technology of








Relation Between the Number of Notes in
Circulation and the Length of Time They Circulate,
Based on the Rate of Detection* for 2001
Average circulation Counterfeit notes
of counterfeits in circulation
*Annual rate of detection: 129,000 notes45 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
limitations of the PFP and LOC methods by building on
their strengths and using a richer set of data than
either of the other two approaches.
Parts-found-in-processing approach
The basic PFP approach extrapolates the rate at which
the monetary authorities detect counterfeits in their
currency processing to the entire stock of currency. PFP
would measure the stock of counterfeits accurately if
(i) detected counterfeits were found only in the Bank
of Canada’s note processing and (ii) the notes proc-
essed by the Bank were representative of outstanding
currency with respect to the share of counterfeits.
Unfortunately, the conditions necessary for the PFP
method are not fulﬁlled. Individuals and businesses
detected the majority of counterfeits in 2001, with the
Bank of Canada accounting for only 22 per cent of
total detections. The Bank’s share of detections ranged
from a high of 32.8 per cent for $10 notes (processed
on average once a year) to a low of 10.6 per cent for
$100 notes (processed on average once every 10 years).
The U.S. Treasury has adapted the PFP approach to
account for counterfeit detections made within the
private sector. The adapted version (PFP’) assumes that
the total detection rate per million notes in circulation
bears the same relationship to the detection rate of the
monetary authority as the total number of detections
per year does to the annual number of detections by
the monetary authority. This adjustment, however,
has the shortcoming that it assumes that currency
turns over in the public’s transactions with the same
frequency as it is processed at the central bank.9,10
Life-of-counterfeits approach
The LOC approach uses an entirely different starting
point by extrapolating the flow of discovered counterfeits
to the outstanding stock using an estimate of the life of
a counterfeit. The shortcomings of the LOC approach
are more practical than those of the PFP approach: data
on the circulating life of counterfeits are meagre.11
9.  Turnover refers to the number of times a note is transferred in making
transactions. The life of a note refers to the time between a note being placed
into circulation and the time it leaves circulation. They are related in that
notes with high turnover wear out more quickly and, as a result, have a
shorter life. The relationship is not perfect because notes may be withdrawn
before they are worn out.
10.   This assumption would imply the following rates of turnover for Can-
ada: $5 = once a year, $10 = once every 10 months, $20 = once every eight
months, $50 = once every ﬁve years, and $100 = once every 10 years.
11. As discussed below, unique data are available with respect to one series of
$100 counterfeit notes that circulated in Canada during the late 1990s.
The Composite Method
The proposed composite approach (COMP) overcomes
some of the limitations of the other two methods. It
recognizes explicitly that screening for counterfeits
takesplacebothinsideandoutsideoftheBankofCanada.
Thepublicandbanksintheirtransactions,andthebanks
in their processing of currency, are the sources of
screening outside of the monetary authority. The pro-
portion of counterfeits removed from batches of cur-
rency before they are passed to the Bank of Canada will
depend on the efficiency of screening when currency is
transferred between individuals, businesses, and banks.
The COMP method combines elements of both PFP and
LOC to estimate the stock of circulating counterfeits.
Like the PFP approach, it uses data on the rate at which
the monetary authority detects counterfeits in its
processing. It also requires data on either the turnover
of the currency or, like the LOC approach, the life of
counterfeits. It also makes use of data on the annual flow
of counterfeits detected outside the monetary authority.
The COMP approach makes use of the following rela-
tionships:
• the relation between the life in circulation of
a stock of counterfeits and the ﬂow of
annual detections
• the turnover rate for currency implied from
the estimated stock of counterfeits and
counterfeit detections by the general public,
and
• the relation between the stock of outstand-
ing counterfeits and the rate of detections
by the monetary authority, given the efﬁ-
ciency of detection by the general public.12
The data used for the COMP estimates are presented in
Table 2.
The estimates make use of a unique set of information
collected by Canadian law-enforcement authorities
from the recovery of a series of high-quality counterfeit
$100 notes circulating in the late 1990s. Certainly this
series was atypical of counterfeit issues: its high quality
brought it to the attention of the authorities and led to
its being designated as a series. Moreover, the series
was produced in sufﬁcient numbers that it accounted
for 80 per cent of $100 counterfeits detected during 1999.
The pattern of recoveries for this counterfeit series from
1998 through 2001 (Chart 1) shows that the number of
12. The method of estimation is expressed in equation form in the Addendum
to this article. The method is described more fully in Chant (2004).46 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
counterfeit notes passed reached a peak in November
1998, near the time of the arrest of the forgers, and then
declined steadily thereafter. The decline, at a rate of
approximately 8 per cent per month, corresponds to an
expected life in circulation of 12.5 months for these
notes.13 This expected life of a counterfeit $100 note
provides the anchor for the rest of the analysis.
13.  The analysis makes use of the concept from physics of mean lifetime of a
particle, which is expressed as the reciprocal of the rate of decay per period.
Detection rate
per million
by Bank 13.06 147.60 26.02 39.11 264.14 49.06
Public’s
share of
detections 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.85 0.90 0.78
Annual
detections 5,306 40,791 30,839 5,275 46,649 128,860
Public
detections 3,577 27,942 22,285 4,483 41,783 100,070
Life of
counterfeit*
(years) - - - - 1.04 -
Life of
authentic
notes (months) 23 22 42 73 108 -
Outstanding
stocks of bank
notes (millions) 145.4 94.8 504.7 97.4 160.2 1,002.5
Table 2
Data for Estimating Outstanding Counterfeits, 2001
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total
*Derived from a designated series of $100 counterfeit notes
Chart 1
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Sources of bias
The COMP estimates should be treated as conditional
because their derivation is based on a number of
assumptions.
• The reported recovery rate for the identiﬁed
series corresponds to the actual recovery rate.
• The assumed life of counterfeits based on
the identiﬁed series reﬂects the experience
of $100 counterfeits overall.
• The relation between the life and turnover
rate of notes of different denominations rep-
resents actual experience.
• All counterfeits detected in circulation are
reported in the Bank of Canada data.
• Notes processed by the Bank of Canada are
representative of notes in circulation.
• The Bank of Canada detects all counterfeits
present in the notes that it processes.
The estimates of circulating counterfeits made on the
basis of the composite method are thus conditional on
these various sources of bias.14 Only one of these
biases, the one arising from the assumption that the
Bank detects all the counterfeits present in the notes it
processes, unequivocally leads to an underestimate of
the number of counterfeits in circulation.15 While it is
possible that the Bank fails to detect all counterfeits in
the notes it processes, it is unlikely that they miss a
signiﬁcant proportion. The Bank scrutinizes bank note
deposits using public security features and features for
the exclusive use of the central bank. For counterfeits to
pass central bank examination, they would need to
incorporate both types of security features. Another of
the biases is ambiguous: failure of the assumed relation
between currency life and turnover to correspond
with the actual relation could lead to either an overes-
timate or an underestimate of circulating counterfeits.
Sensitivity tests, however, suggest that even substan-
tial differences in turnover values close to those
estimated would not materially affect the estimates
of circulating counterfeits.16 It can be shown that all
the remaining identiﬁed biases result in conservative
14.  These sources of bias and their consequences are discussed more fully in
Chant (2004).
15. The U.S. Treasury also makes this assumption in developing its estimates.
Allison and Pianalto (1997) concede, however, that the Federal Reserve only
detects “virtually all counterfeit notes,” not all counterfeits in the notes that it
processes.
16.  For example, raising the assumed turnover of $20 bills by 10 per cent
would raise the estimate of counterfeits outstanding by just 0.8 per cent.47 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
estimates, in that they overstate the degree of counter-
feit notes in circulation. Though the remaining bias is
ambiguous, the effects are likely to be small.
The Estimates
The COMP estimates of outstanding counterfeits pre-
sented in Table 3 show a number of features of the
counterfeits circulating during 2001. Counterfeiting in
that year was predominantly a problem for $100
notes, which accounted for 58 per cent of the numbers
and 88 per cent of the value of counterfeits estimated
to be in circulation. The estimates also provide an
overall indication on the signiﬁcance of counterfeit-
ing. Counterfeits appear to have accounted for no
more than 0.03 per cent of outstanding notes for any
denomination and only 0.008 per cent of the total
number of outstanding bank notes. Counterfeits in
total are estimated to have been 0.015 per cent of the
value of outstanding currency.
Counterfeits in total are estimated to
have been 0.015 per cent of the value
of outstanding currency.
Private rate
of detection (%) 5.6 5.7 8.9 10.6 12.8 -
Per million
notes outstanding 13.8 156.5 28.6 43.7 302.9 83.8
Annual turnover
of currency 31.6 33.0 17.3 10.0 6.7 -
Life of
counterfeit
in years 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.81 1.04 -
Lifetime turnover
of counterfeits 11.98 12.02 8.09 8.04 7.00 -
No. of
counterfeits 2,012 14,840 14,421 4,259 48,515 84,047
Share of total
by number (%) 2.4 17.7 17.2 5.1 57.7 100
Value of
counterfeits ($) 10,060 148,400 288,400 212,950 4,851,500 5,511,310
Share of total
by value (%) 0.2 2.7 5.2 3.9 88.0 100
Table 3
Estimates of Counterfeits in Circulation by
Denomination, 2001
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total
Source: Derived by methods described in Chant (2004)
How do these stock estimates differ from other infor-
mation about counterfeits? Table 4 compares the esti-
mates for 2001 with another measure of counterfeits,
the recoveries from circulation during the same year.
The comparison shows that the new estimates strengthen
and reinforce the indications that counterfeiting in
2001was primarily a problem of high-denomination
bills. Table 4 suggests that $5 and $10 counterfeits were
much less important in 2001 in terms of circulating
counterfeits than they were for recoveries. Their share
fell from over 35 per cent of recoveries to just 20 per
cent of the circulating stock and from 7 per cent to just
3 per cent in value. In contrast, the share of $100 coun-
terfeitsinnumberwasalmost60percenthigheramong
circulating counterfeits than it was among recoveries.
The $100 notes accounted for 88 per cent of the value of
all circulating counterfeits.
Conclusions
This article has analyzed different aspects of the recent
Canadian experience with counterfeiting. Conditional
estimates indicate that the incidence of circulating
counterfeits in Canada is a small fraction of the forensic
analyst’s speculations for European and U.S. currencies
noted in the introduction. The analysis suggests that
the probability of any bill being counterfeit is estimated
to be less than one in 10,000 for Canadian currency
overall. Indications are that there was one counterfeit
note in circulation for every 290 Canadians in 2001 and
that the value of outstanding counterfeits was less than
19 cents per person.17 The estimates also strengthen the
perception that counterfeiting in Canada during 2001
was a greater threat for high-denomination bills than it
was for low-denomination bills.
17.  See the Addendum for an update to 2003.
Recoveries
Number 5,306 40,791 30,839 5,275 46,649 128,860
(% of total) (4.1) (31.7) (23.9) (4.1) (36.2) (100)
Value ($) 26,530 407,910 616,780 263,750 4,664,900 5,979,870
(% of value) (0.4) (6.8) (10.3) (4.4) (78.0) (100)
Estimated
circulation
Number 2,012 14,840 14,421 4,259 48,515 84,047
(% of total) (2.4) (17.7) (17.2) (5.1) (57.7) (100)
Value ($) 10,060 148,400 288,400 212,950 4,851,500 5,511,310
(% of value) (0.2) (2.7) (5.2) (3.9) (88.0) (100)
Table 4
Comparison of Measures of Counterfeits, 2001
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total48 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
These estimates may appear to be at odds with current
perceptions of the severity of counterfeiting. This dif-
ference may be understandable because the costs of
accepting bogus currency tend to be concentrated
among “small ticket” retailers such as fast food outlets
and convenience stores. Dealing with these merchants
gives passers of counterfeit bills the opportunity to
receive authentic currency as change when paying for
small purchases with high-denomination bills. Small
retailers are especially vulnerable because they tend to
rely more than others on part-time, less-skilled employ-
ees. In some areas of the country, merchants have
focused attention on counterfeiting by refusing to
accept some denominations, like the $100 bill.
Another perspective on the costs of counterfeiting
comes from comparing losses from counterfeiting with
those from other payment mediums. The Canadian
public lost less than $6 million from accepting fake cur-
rency during 2001 while, in comparison, total losses
from bank credit card fraud exceeded $142 million,
morethan20timesasmuch.18Thesedifferencesappear
much larger than can be accounted for by payments
transacted by each method of payment. Currency
would need to turn over just slightly more than three
times per year to support the volume of transactions
made by credit cards. Our estimates of turnover range
from just under 7 for the $100 note to more than 30 for
the lowest denomination notes.
The Canadian public lost less than
$6 million from accepting fake
currency during 2001 while, in
comparison, total losses from bank
credit card fraud exceeded $142
million, more than 20 times as much.
The method proposed in this article could be extended to
cross-country and historical comparisons if information
about the critical variables with respect to the circulating
lifeofcounterfeitswereavailable.Suchanextensioncould
18.   The costs from credit card fraud are rarely borne directly by the card-
holder, given that card agreements generally limit the cardholder’s losses.
Nevertheless, these losses are a cost of business for card issuers and will be
reﬂected in merchant banking fees and consumer credit charges, rather than
being charged against victimized retailers or cardholders. See the Canadian
Bankers Association Web site at http://www.cba.ca and click on Resource
Centre/Statistics for statistics on credit card losses.
exploit the variety of different security devices in national
currenciesatdifferenttimesandacrossvariousdenomina-
tions in order to assess their effectiveness.19 The results of
such an analysis could provide the basis for the develop-
ment of further measures to prevent counterfeiting.
The probability that counterfeit notes accounted for
approximately 0.008 per cent of the currency in circula-
tion in 2001 should not be grounds for complacency:
the technology available to counterfeiters continues to
advance. Public policy towards counterfeiting will be
influenced by an inherent paradox of crime prevention:
the threat of a crime, in some sense, is not measured by
actual crime rates, but by the rates that would be
observed in the absence of prevention. The observed
counterfeiting levels reflect the substantial expense of
features such as elaborate designs, security devices,
and distinctive paper incurred by the Bank of Canada
to prevent the illicit duplication of its currency; the pri-
vate costs borne mainly by retailers in their efforts to
avoid accepting counterfeits; and the public costs of
education, policing, and the administration of justice.
Assuring appropriate policy responses to the threat of
counterfeiting, including those of law-enforcement
agencies and courts, is vital because failure to deal with
counterfeiting could possibly threaten the public’s con-
fidence in all or a part of a country’s currency.
Public policy towards counterfeiting
will be inﬂuenced by an inherent
paradox of crime prevention: the
threat of a crime, in some sense, is not
measured by actual crime rates, but
by the rates that would be observed in
the absence of prevention.
19.   In addition, any such study would need to take account of other factors
that may inﬂuence the incidence of counterfeiting, such as a country’s level of
income, the effectiveness of its law enforcement, and cultural factors.
For information on how to authenticate a bank note, visit
the Bank of Canada’s Web site at <http://www.bankof-
canada.ca/en/banknotes/counterfeit/index.html>.
You can also ﬁnd information by contacting the Bank
directly: E-mail: education@bank-banque-canada.ca
Telephone: 1-888-513-821249 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
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Addendum: Estimating the Stock of
Counterfeit Notes in Circulation,
1993–2003
Varya Taylor, Department of Banking Operations
The number of counterfeit detections in Canada has
grown signiﬁcantly since 2001. These detections rose
from 128,920 in 2001 (with a face value of $6.0 million)
to 208,470 ($4.9 million) in 2002 and 443,300 ($12.7 mil-
lion) in 2003.
In this addendum, the methodology developed by
Chant (2004)1 is used to estimate the stock of counter-
feits in circulation from 1993 to 2003. Related esti-
mates of the public’s ability to detect counterfeits,
annual turnover of counterfeits, and the average life of
a counterfeit are also examined.
Chant’s “composite approach” to estimating the stock
of counterfeits recognizes that the stock of outstand-
ing counterfeits depends on the life of counterfeits (L),
which in turn depends on central bank processing (p),
and the detection ability of the public (e).
The approach exploits the information contained in
public detections (PD) and Bank detections (BD) to
derive key parameters of the model as:
(1)
(2)
where T represents the number of times a counterfeit
circulates per year, otherwise known as its turnover
rate (see Box).
 1. “Counterfeiting: A Canadian Perspective,“ Bank of Canada Working
Paper (forthcoming), Ottawa: Bank of Canada.
e*T
1 ( e) –
----------------- p*(PD/BD) =
1 e – () *L = BD/p
BD PD +
----------------------- Chant uses unique information on the life of a particu-
lar $100 counterfeit to derive turnover and efﬁciency
from equations (1) and (2). Given turnover of the $100,
the turnover of other denominations is set by assum-
ing a relation of proportionality between turnover and
the average life of bank notes, and other parameters
are derived accordingly.
One way to use the model in a time-series perspective
is to hold one of the three parameters (e, T, L) constant
at its estimated 2001 value and derive the other two
from the above equations.
Chant’s model is based on three key relationships:
Public detections (PD) depend on the ability of the
public to recognize a counterfeit note (0 < e < 1),
the number of counterfeits in circulation (C), and
the turnover rate (T)
. (i)
Since the Bank of Canada will detect all remaining
counterfeits that it receives in processing, Bank
detections in any period (BD) will depend on the
proportion (p) of total notes in circulation that the
Bank processes during that period:
. (ii)
The average life (L) of a counterfeit is deﬁned as
the ratio of the stock of counterfeit notes in circula-
tion to the annual ﬂow of total detections:
. (iii)
PD e*T*C =
BD p*1 e – () *C =
L C
BD PD +
----------------------- =52 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2004
The Estimates
In this exercise, two cases are examined: one in which
the efﬁciency of public screening (e) is held at its esti-
mated 2001 value, and one in the which annual turno-
ver rate (T) is held ﬁxed at its estimated 2001 value.
The assumption of a constant average life of counter-
feits is not contemplated because it is violated by the
data. In some periods, for example, 2002 in the case of
the $100 note, the right-hand side of equation (2)—
which is a fraction of the counterfeit life—is already
larger than the 2001 estimated average life.
Constant Efﬁciency of Public Screening
Chart A1 plots the estimated life of counterfeits for all
denominations on the assumption of a constant efﬁ-
ciency of public screening. The overall rise in counter-
feit lives would be consistent with the signiﬁcant
decline in the Bank processing rate following the
introduction of the Bank Note Distribution System in
1997 (Chart A2).2 However, the sharp rise in the aver-
age life of the $100 counterfeit bills in 2002 suggests a
drop in turnover, perhaps the result of retailers refus-
ing to accept that note.
Chart A1
Average Counterfeit Life with Efﬁciency



























2. Rates of processing bank notes at the Bank of Canada fell sharply follow-
ing the implementation of the Bank Note Distribution System. For example,
in 1996, 1.8 billion notes were processed, compared to 608 million in 2003.
With less processing, the rate of Bank detections relative to public detections
has declined. For further reading on the implementation of the new system,
see Bilkes (1997).
The broad-based decline in counterfeit lives in 2003
that resulted from the relatively high level of public
detections that year suggests an increase in the rate of
public efﬁciency (consistent with increased public
awareness) or a rise (unexplained) in turnover.
Chart A3 shows the annual turnover rates estimated
for each denomination on the assumption of a con-
stant rate of public efﬁciency. It shows a trend decline
broken by a sharp increase in 2003 across all denomi-
Chart A2
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nations. The turnover of the $5 note stands out as par-
ticularly erratic; the spike in 1997, which is
attributable to a large increase in public detections rel-
ative to Bank detections, is magniﬁed by the small
number of counterfeits. The same is true of the 1995
spike in the turnover of the $50 note.
Chart A4 illustrates the growth in the stock of coun-
terfeits over the past decade on the assumption of
constant efﬁciency of public screening.3 Historical
peaks are found in 2001 for the $100 note, in 2002 for
the $5 and $10 notes, and in 2003 for the $20 and $50
notes. The highest stock of total counterfeits in circula-
tion occurs in 2003, and is estimated at 151,550 notes,
for a total value of $6.8 million. This represents a
25 per cent increase in volume and a 37 per cent
increase in value from 2002, or an 80 per cent increase
involumeanda23percentincreaseinvaluefrom 2001.
Signiﬁcantly, the increase in the estimated stock of
counterfeits is considerably less than the increase in
the annual ﬂow of counterfeits detected.
Constant Turnover
Alternatively, we can hold annual turnover constant
at 2001 levels and allow counterfeit life and public
efﬁciency to vary. As seen in Chart A5, average coun-
terfeit life again follows a steady upward trend, fol-
lowed by a drop in 2003.
Chart A4
Outstanding Counterfeits in Circulation






















 3. The stock of counterfeits is estimated from equation (ii) in the Box on page 51.
Public efﬁciency rates derived on the assumption of
constant turnovers (Chart A6) remain fairly stable
from 1997 onwards, with a slight downward trend
until a pickup is observed in 2003. Increased public
efﬁciency in 2003 coincides with the high volume of
counterfeits detected by the public that year and may
have been a result of media coverage and joint educa-
tion efforts by the Bank of Canada and police services.
Chart A5
Average Counterfeit Life with Annual
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Chart A7 shows that when turnover is held constant,
the total stock of counterfeits is estimated as 161,900 in
2003, for a value of $7.1 million. As in the ﬁrst case,
this represents a historically high volume and value of
counterfeits in circulation, but a smaller increase over
2001 in the stock of counterfeits than in the annual
ﬂow of detections.
Conclusion
Estimating the equations over a span of ten years
yields interesting insights into the public’s ability to
detect counterfeits, the average life of counterfeits,
turnover rates, and changes in the stock of counter-
feits.
Holding either turnover or the rate of public efﬁciency
constant produces a gradual rise in the estimated
average life of counterfeits. This seems plausible,
given the changes in bank note processing since
1997. When public efﬁciency is held constant, the rise in
counterfeit life would also be associated with a fall in
turnover (which is not implausible, given the
increased use of debit cards as a substitute for cash).
Chart A7
Outstanding Counterfeits in Circulation





















When turnover is held constant, the rise in counterfeit
life would be associated with a decrease in the pub-
lic’s ability to detect counterfeit notes (which is also
plausible, given that improvements in reprographic
technology augmented the quality of counterfeits).
The truth may lie in between these two cases. Since
both yield similar estimates for the stock of counter-
feits in circulation, the range of probable outcomes is
found to be fairly narrow (151,500 to 162,000 in 2003).
The results show a marked change in the state of
counterfeiting since 2001.The incidence of counterfeit-
ing has nearly doubled since then and is no longer pri-
marily limited to the $100 note. In 2003, the probability
of a note being a counterfeit is estimated to be highest
for the $10 note, at 0.05 per cent (or 5 in 10,000), fol-
lowed by the $50 and $100 notes, at 0.02 per cent, the
$20 note at 0.007 per cent, and the $5 note, at 0.002 per
cent (2 in 100,000 notes).4
Interestingly, the data on the ratio of public to Bank
detections suggest that the turnover of the $100 note
declined temporarily in 2002 (consistent with anecdo-
tal evidence of reduced acceptance of that denomina-
tion among retailers). The data further suggest that
the public efﬁciency rate rose in 2003 (consistent with
increased public awareness of counterfeiting).The
increase in efﬁciency would explain the sharp drop in
the average life of a counterfeit observed in 2003.
The Bank is continuing to introduce a new series of
bank notes with more advanced security features to
discourage present and future counterfeiting activity.
In addition, the Bank uses educational initiatives to
increase public awareness. The quantum increase in
bank note security is evident in the new $100 note in
the Canadian Journey series, issued in March 2004. It
will be followed by the release of the new $20 note in
September 2004 and the new $50 note shortly after.
4. The new $100 note introduced in March 2004 incorporates advanced secu-
rity features that have successfully deterred counterfeiters. The probability of
a new $100 bill being a counterfeit is thus close to nil at present.